The World's Largest Humantarian Crisis:

Darfur, Sudan

*NUMBERS AT A GLANCE*   Conflict-Affected Persons in            2.39 million people Darfur and Eastern Chad     Internally Displaced Persons            1.9 million people (IDPs) in Darfur     Sudanese Refugees in Eastern          350,000 people Chad     Conflict-Affected Persons in              1.2 million January Darfur Receiving Food                         1.5 million December Assistance     Malnutrition Among Children            22% under age 5     IDP Deaths due to Disease                  10000  people/month and Malnutrition(not including           70000 between violence-related deaths or                    March and Oct. 2004 deaths of those not in camps

 

 

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15000 Die Every Month   U.N. Now Estimates 180,000 Dead in Sudan By EDITH M. LEDERER, AP   UNITED NATIONS (March 16) - The United Nations now estimates that about 180,000 people have died in Sudan's western Darfur region as a result of violence, disease or malnutrition since October 2003 - 2 1/2 times the previous estimate. U.N. emergency relief officials believe the number of deaths has recently decreased because of increased humanitarian aid and improved access to the vast region, but the Sudanese government hasn't given a green light for a new U.N. mortality survey, U.N. spokeswoman Stephanie Bunker said Tuesday. Last week, U.N. humanitarian chief Jan Egeland said that far more people had died in Darfur than the 70,000 reported since last year. "Is it three times that, is it five times that, I don't know, but it's several times the number of 70,000 that have died altogether," she said. But this week Egeland came up with the 180,000 figure - about 10,000 deaths a month from October 2003 until March 2005, Bunker said. "It is a rough estimate," she stressed.   The main basis of the new estimate is a World Health Organization survey that found that up to 10,000 people a month were dying in Darfur between March and September 2004, Bunker said. "We believe that recently mortality has decreased because of increased humanitarian assistance and access," she said. "However, we also believe that mortality rates prior to March 2004 were higher than the period covered by the survey because at that time there were almost no humanitarian aid workers on the ground," she said. Averaging the higher and lower periods, Egeland estimates that 10,000 Sudanese died every month over the 18-month period as a result of fighting, hunger and disease, Bunker said. Eric Reeves, an English professor at SmithCollege in Northampton, Mass., who has written extensively on Sudan, issued his 12th assessment of mortality in Darfur on Friday, which was more than double Egeland's - approximately 380,000. Reeves estimated the current mortality rate at 15,000 deaths per month.   The Darfur conflict began after two non-Arab rebel groups took up arms against  the Arab-dominated government in February 2003 to win more political and economic rights for the region's African tribes. Sudan's Arab government is accused of responding by backing Janjaweed militiamen who have carried out rapes and killings against Sudanese of African origin. The government denies backing the Janjaweed. Egeland said last week that the figure of 70,000 dead was released when there were 1 million internally displaced people in Darfur, but that number has now doubled. As the number of people who have fled increases, the number who die of malnutrition or a host of other reasons also goes up, he said. The U.N. humanitarian chief estimated that the number of displaced people in Darfur could rise to between 3 million and 4 million.   ____________________________________________________________________________     HOW TO STOP THE GENOCIDE Mr. Bush, Here’s a Plan for Darfur By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF Published: August 6, 2007 Frustrated by the genocide he is tolerating in Darfur, President Bush has suggested to aides on occasion that maybe the U.S. should just send troops there.   He alluded to that when he told a woman in Tennessee who asked him about Darfur: “The threshold question was: If there is a problem, why don’t you just go take care of it?” Mr. Bush was talked out of the idea by Condi Rice, who told him that the U.S. just couldn’t start another war in a Muslim country. So, as Mr. Bush told the questioner: “I made the decision not to send U.S. troops unilaterally into Darfur.”   That was the right decision. The Sudanese regime would use our invasion as a rallying cry against infidels and make the crisis harder to resolve. But the upshot was that Mr. Bush, lacking a military option, hasn’t taken up other options. He seems genuinely appalled by the horrors of Darfur — he raises them regularly with foreign leaders, even when aides haven’t put them on his talking points — yet he has done little, apparently because he doesn’t know quite what to do. So here are some practical suggestions. FIRST the administration should invest far more energy toward seeking a negotiated peace between rebels and government — the only long-term solution to the slaughter. Instead, the diplomatic focus has been on U.N. peacekeepers, and they are a terrific addition but not a solution in themselves. The preliminary step is for the rebels to form a united negotiating front, and they are now meeting in Tanzania to do so. The U.S. desperately needs to assist that process to the hilt. SECOND, we should back an international appeal for Sudan to release Suleiman Jamous, an elder who is one of the best hopes for uniting the rebel factions and leading them to peace. THIRD, we need to work with other countries to insist that Sudan stop importing tens of thousands of Arabs from neighboring countries to repopulate those areas where it has slaughtered the local population. These new settlements seal the demographic consequences of genocide, outrage the survivors and make peace harder to achieve. FOURTH, we need to increase intelligence coverage over the area, and release occasional satellite photos so that Sudan knows it is being watched. Releasing a photo of the beleaguered Gereida camp, for example, would reduce the chance that Sudan will slaughter its 130,000 occupants. FIFTH, Mr. Bush can join Nicolas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown in the trip they have discussed to Chad. They should also publicly invite the leaders of China and Egypt, two countries that are critical to pressuring Sudan, to join them. SIXTH, the U.S. can quietly encourage Muslim leaders to push for peace. Malaysia’s prime minister, who is also the head of a group of Islamic countries, has prepared a peace proposal, and Saudi Arabia is interested in helping. SEVENTH, Mr. Bush can use the bully pulpit. He can give a prime-time speech or bring Darfuri refugees to the White House for a photo-op. EIGHTH, the U.S. should begin contingency planning in case Sudan starts mass slaughters of people in camps, or in case Sudan resumes its war against its south. If the former, we could secure camps and create a corridor to bring survivors to Chad; if the latter, we should arm South Sudan and perhaps blockade Port Sudan. NINTH, we need to work much more with China, which has the most leverage over Sudan. The goal should be to get China to suspend arms transfers to Sudan until Khartoum makes a serious effort at peace. TENTH, we can work with France to stabilize Chad and Central African Republic. President Sarkozy is pushing for European peacekeepers to rescue both countries after Sudanese-sponsored proxy invasions, and he deserves strong support. Finally, we should work with Britain and France to enforce the U.N.’s ban on offensive military flights in Darfur. At a minimum, we should seek U.N. sanctions for Sudan’s violations. In addition, when Sudan bombs a village, we can afterward destroy one of its Chinese-made A-5 Fantan fighter bombers that it keeps in Darfur. Many aid workers disagree with this suggestion, for fear that Sudan will retaliate by cutting off humanitarian access. But after four years, I think we need to show President Omar Hassan al-Bashir that he will pay a price for genocide. And he values his gunships and fighter bombers in a way he has never valued his people.

Eyewitness Account   From: lrogoff@ushmm.org Subject: TOMORROW: Darfur Eyewitness: Brian Steidle Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2005 Committee on Conscience U.S.HolocaustMemorialMuseum TOMORROW: Friday, March 18 2 p.m. R.S.V.P. at 202-314-7868   Darfur Eyewitness: Brian Steidle "Steidle and the monitors ... have persisted and become witnesses to systematic crimes against humanity."   Brian Steidle, a former U.S. Marine, was a member of the African Union team monitoring the conflict in Darfur, where he took hundreds of photographs documenting atrocities. Join us to learn what he witnessed in Darfur and to see the evidence he gathered.   For more information, please find below Nicholas Kristofs editorial about Brian Steidle. An American Witness to Sudans Systematic Killing By Nicholas D. Kristof  The New York Times March 3, 2005   American soldiers are trained to shoot at the enemy. They`re prepared to be shot at. But what young men like Brian Steidle are not equipped for is witnessing a genocide but being unable to protect the civilians pleading for help.  If President Bush wants to figure out whether the U.S. should stand more firmly against the genocide in Darfur, I suggest that he invite Mr. Steidle to the White House to give a briefing. Mr. Steidle, a 28-year-old former Marine captain, was one of just three American military advisers for the African Union monitoring team in Darfur - and he is bursting with frustration. "Every single day you go out to see another burned village, and more dead bodies," he said. "And the children - you see 6-month-old babies that have been shot, and 3-year-old kids with their faces smashed in with rifle butts. And you just have to stand there and write your reports.  "While journalists and aid workers are sharply limited in their movements in Darfur, Mr. Steidle and the monitors traveled around by truck and helicopter to investigate massacres by the Sudanese government and the janjaweed militia it sponsors.    They have sometimes been shot at, and once his group was held hostage, but they have persisted and become witnesses to systematic crimes against humanity. So is it really genocide? "I have no doubt about that," Mr. Steidle said. "It`s a systematic cleansing of peoples by the Arab chiefs there. And when you talk to them, that`s what they tell you. They`re very blunt about it. One day we met a janjaweed leader and he said, `Unless you get back four camels that were stolen in 2003, then we`re going to go to these four villages and burn the villages, rape the women, kill everyone.` And they did." The African Union doesn`t have the troops, firepower or mandate to actually stop the slaughter, just to monitor it. Mr. Steidle said his single most frustrating moment came in December when the Sudanese government and the janjaweed attacked the village of Labado, which had 25,000 inhabitants.   Mr. Steidle and his unit flew to the area in helicopters, but a Sudanese general refused to let them enter the village - and also refused to stop the attack. "It was extremely frustrating - seeing the village burn, hearing gunshots, not being able to do anything," Mr. Steidle said. "The entire village is now gone. It`s a big black spot on the earth." When Sudan`s government is preparing to send bombers or helicopter gunships to attack an African village, it shuts down the cellphone system so no one can send out warnings. Thus the international monitors know when a massacre is about to unfold. But there`s usually nothing they can do.   The West, led by the Bush administration, is providing food and medical care that is keeping hundreds of thousands of people alive. But we`re managing the genocide, not halting it. "The world is failing Darfur," said Jan Egeland, the U.N. under secretary general for humanitarian affairs. "We`re only playing the humanitarian card, and we`re just witnessing the massacres." President Bush is pushing for sanctions, but European countries like France are disgracefully cool to the idea - and China is downright hostile, playing the same supportive role for the Darfur genocide that it did for the Khmer Rouge genocide.   Mr. Steidle has just quit his job with the African Union, but he plans to continue working in Darfur to do his part to stand up to the killers. Most of us don`t have to go to that extreme of risking our lives in Darfur - we just need to get off the fence and push our government off, too. At one level, I blame President Bush - and, even more, the leaders of European, Arab and African nations - for their passivity. But if our leaders are acquiescing in genocide, that`s because we citizens are passive, too. If American voters cared about Darfur`s genocide as much as about, say, the Michael Jackson trial, then our political system would respond. One useful step would be the passage of the Darfur Accountability Act, to be introduced today by Senators Jon Corzine and Sam Brownback. The legislation calls for such desperately needed actions as expanding the African Union force and establishing a military no-fly zone to stop Sudan from bombing civilians.   As Martin Luther King Jr. put it: "Man`s inhumanity to man is not only perpetrated by the vitriolic actions of those who are bad. It is also perpetrated by the vitiating inaction of those who are good."

CONGO      A vast country with immense economic resources, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) has been at the centre of what could be termed Africa's world war. Concern about DRC stems from the: 1.            Magnitude of violence against civilians 2.            Rampant plunder of DRCs resources 3.            Renewed fighting amid the peace process 4.            Conflicts relationship to the 1994 Rwanda genocide   The five-year conflict pitted government forces, supported by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, against rebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda. Despite a peace deal and the formation of a transitional government in 2003, the threat of civil war remains.   FACTS:              Population: 56 million (UN, 2005)              Capital: Kinshasa              Area: 2.34 million sq km (905,354 sq miles)              Major languages: French, Lingala, Kiswahili, Kikongo, Tshiluba              Major religions: Christianity, Islam History of the conflict The Democratic Republic of the Congo's most recent war originated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which over 500,000 minority Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus were slaughtered by an extremist Hutu government. Claiming that Hutu gnocidaires had taken refuge within eastern Congo, Rwanda and Uganda backed a May 1997 rebellion in Congo, removing Mobutu Sese Seko, the Congo's leader since 1965, and replacing him with Laurent Kabila. However, when Kabila moved to purge Tutsis from his government, Rwanda intervened in DRC for a second time, this time with the intention of removing Kabila. Rwandan troops backing Congolese Tutsi rebels invaded in August 1998, leading Kabila to seek assistance from Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. Kabila managed to avoid the fate of his predecessor, Mobutu, but DRC was launched into a conflict in which nearly 4 million have died -- most of them from war-related disease and starvation. The countries involved, and later the non-governmental actors, signed a ceasefire agreement at Lusaka, Zambia, in July 1999 and the UN Security Council sent a peacekeeping mission (MONUC) to the Congo in 2000. The violence continued, however, fuelled by mineral wealth in the east. Laurent Kabila himself was assassinated January 2001 and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. Peace negotiations went on through 2002, with Ugandan and Rwandan withdrawal to be met with the demobilisation and disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels in eastern Congo. By the end of 2002, Rwanda and Uganda claimed they had fully withdrawn from DRC, although their proxies remained. A power-sharing unity government was set up under Joseph Kabila in July 2003 with four vice-presidents, three of them from former rebel groups. Meanwhile, a long-simmering conflict over land and mineral wealth in north-eastern Ituri region broke into widespread inter-ethnic violence and massacres 2002-2003. An EU, predominantly French, 3-month emergency mission was launched July 2003 and managed to contain a situation that UN troops had been unable to deal with. With the situation back under control, a more robust UN mission (MONUC II) deployed in the Congo. The political transition has now stalled and is at risk of failure. The effort to establish a national army that can ensure stability in the country is faltering and various armed groups continue to threaten the stability of the country. The Congo's neighbours continue to perceive the situation as a threat to their interests and have taken actions that further destabilise the fragile process of transition.  The events in 2004 in the Kivus when Rwandan troops crossed into DRC, the current violence in Ituri, ongoing tensions in Kinshasa and Kasai are stark warnings that the conflict in the Congo could quickly spiral into another large scale-war.. This war pitted Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi against the government of DRC, which was supported by Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia. All countries have armed and supported militias, which continue to fight even after the foreign countries have left DRC. The second war alone has cost 3.8 million lives. An internationally sponsored peace process has inched forward, but it is threatened by continuing conflict, often along ethnic lines; by militias (including some accused of involvement in the Rwanda genocide); by neighboring countries pursuit of their own interests in DRC; and by elite criminal networks that are plundering Congos rich natural resources under cover of the conflict. A peace process and renewed conflict An internationally sponsored peace process has inched forward, based on an accord signed in 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia. The focus of the Lusaka Accord and other diplomatic efforts has been to get foreign forces out of Congo and to establish an interim Congolese government that includes representatives of the Congolese rebel groups in the east. Foreign forces have formally withdrawn and a Government of National Unity, a transitional government, was established in Kinshasa in June 2003. But these steps have not substantially alleviated the crisis in the east. In fact, in 2003, the killing spiked upon withdrawal of the Ugandan forces. One reason that the withdrawal of foreign forces has not improved the situation is that Uganda and Rwanda, as well as the DRC government, continue to exercise control through the use of proxy militias. Additionally, there remain many other armed groups, including forces composed of former genocidaires from Rwanda.   Another element of the Lusaka Accords was a peacekeeping force authorized by the UN Security Council. Called MONUC after its French acronym, it began as an underequipped, undermanned, outgunned force. MONUC was buttressed by a French-led force in June 2003 and was soon given a more robust mandate with increased numbers of troops. In February 2005, nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers were killed. MONUC responded by using force and issuing an ultimatum that militias disarm. However, it remains small in comparison to the tasks it faces and the area it covers, and has been accused of committing sexual abuses against civilians it should be protecting. Violence against civilians continues, particularly in the east, where rape, attacks by armed forces, and the collapse of much of the countrys health system and economic structures remain serious and constant threats to the population. On June 23, 2004, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the International Criminal Court prosecutor, announced that the Courts first-ever investigation would probe crimes committed throughout DRC. The investigation was triggered by a request from the Congolese transitional government.  Violence Against Civilians The International Rescue Committee has called the war in the Congo the deadliest conflict since World War II. Their 2004 mortality study reports 3.8 million deaths in excess of normal mortality rates from 1998 2004. The violence against civilians has been exceptionally cruel, with reports indicating rampant incidents of rape, mutilation, and murder as means to terrify the civilian population. Much of the violence has occurred in the Kivu region of eastern Congo. The various forces engaged in the war are often formed around ethnic identity and victims are often targeted because of belonging to a different ethnic group. Additionally, extremists often use fear of genocide or ethnically targeted attacks among the population in order to rationalize their own attacks. 3. What needs to be done One: free and fair elections. The parliament must pass key electoral laws; President Kabila must keep his commitment to appoint new local administrations that fairly reflect the power-sharing agreement signed in Pretoria in 2002; and the international community must set up an effective system for monitoring the elections 2006. Two: good governance and justice. A joint donors/Congolese mechanism should be implemented to curb state corruption; donor aid should be tied to specific progress on good governance and strengthening Congolese institutions, in particular the judiciary and parliamentary commissions; a specialised human rights chamber should be established within the court system to supplement the work of the International Criminal Court; and the Security Council should enact targeted sanctions against the violators of the arms embargo. Three: an integrated national army and police force to establish security. Donors should create an International Military Assistance and Training Team (IMATT) to integrate all aid and training for the new security forces; assistance for security sector reform should be increased and a working group established to coordinate support for police development. Four: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the FDLR. Peaceful efforts to entice the Rwandan Hutu rebels (FDLR) home must be exhausted, with Rwanda clarifying which officers it intends to prosecute for genocide and offering more generous incentives for others to return; there should be international monitoring of the return process and targeted Security Council sanctions against hard-line leaders, especially those in Europe. In parallel, there should be preparation for, and commencement of, military pressure on the FDLR, with MONUC taking the initial lead. Five: fulfilment of MONUC's mandate to protect civilians. The UN Security Council needs to authorise more troops for MONUC; the EU and other donors should give it greater access to intelligence assets; and either MONUC's mandate should be formally strengthened or its concept of operations should be clarified to ensure that it acts more robustly and proactively against the FDLR and other armed groups.   Congo Atrocities in Online Exhibition The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's Committee on Conscience, in cooperation with the International Crisis Group and Angelina Jolie, has launched an online exhibition, Ripples of Genocide: Journey Through Eastern Congo, chronicling the devastation unfolding in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Click here to learn more. Listen to "The Ongoing Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo", part of the U.S. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's series entitled The Voices of Genocide Prevention, with Crisis Group Senior Analyst Jason Stearns and Rick Brennan of the International Rescue Committee. Watch video on Congo ABC's news program Nightline broadcast a report on the Congo in November 2005, prepared with Crisis Group's assistance.  Click here to watch the video. Click here for video images of the Congo. TV journalists can contact Kimberly Abbott in WashingtonDC at +1 202 785 1601 for more information or additional footage. For more information, see Crisis Group's most recent reports, Congos Elections: Making or Breaking the Peace, 27 April 2006; Security Sector Reform in the Congo, 13 February 2006; and Katanga: The Congos Forgotten Crisis, 9 January 2006.   ********************************************************* ********************************************************* BURUNDI   A civil war in Burundi began in 1993 and took the lives of at least 200,000 people, displacing over 500,000.   The reasons we are watching Burma is because:                                  History of ethnic conflict in Burundi                                  Level of human rights abuses                                  Incomplete peace process                                  Continued instability in the region                                  Relationship to the 1994 Rwanda genocide   Burundi and Rwanda have similar ethnic compostions, and violence in either country has had a senior impact on each others, particularly the assassination of Burundis president in 1993 and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. And the internal conflicts in both Rwanda and Burundi are played out in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While the situation in Burundi has stabilized and significant improvements have been made, starting with a peace agreement signed in 2000, the history of conflict between the historically Tutsi-dominated government and Hutu rebels retains a potential for severe ethnically targeted violence.   Burundi is demographically similar to neighboring Rwanda, approximately 85% Hutu and 14% Tutsi, 1% Twa. A major difference between the two countries is that Burundi entered its post-colonial period, achieving independence in 1962, with a constitutional monarchy under an ethnically mixed government. Nonetheless, politics and even more so the military have been dominated by one group of Tutsi. Extremists unwilling to share power have responded to attempts by moderate Tutsi and Hutu to create a more inclusive politics by heightening ethnic tensions. As ethnicity was used for political ends, in a self-fulfilling prophecy, mass violence resulted. Thus, ethnic group identity became both a product of and cause for conflict. Among the worst massacres occurred in 1972, when Hutu groups tried to overthrow the government, which responded with a coordinated plan attacking prominent Hutu: political leaders, the wealthy, and educated. As many as 200,000 were killed. More massacres followed, as politicians and the military seized upon ethnicity to consolidate their control and avoid reform. Civil War On June 1, 1993, Melchior Ndadaye became Burundis first Hutu president. The previous president and Ndadayes electoral opponent, Pierre Buyoya, paved the way for a democratic transition by liberalizing Burundis electoral process and immediately recognizing the results. This glimmer of hope was eclipsed in October 1993, when the army, opposed to reform initiatives, assassinated Ndadaye. Although in the end the army pledged allegiance to the government, the coup reasserted the power of elite groups within the army and of violence against the prospect of a multiethnic government. In the days that followed the assassination, Hutu rebels killed an estimated 100,000 Tutsi and the army killed tens of thousands of Hutu civilians. Hundreds of thousands left as refugees at least 200,000 arrived in Tanzania alone. A panel convened by the UN Security Council called the massacres of Tutsi in the days immediately following the assassination "acts of genocide." The fighting continued, with both sides committing atrocities, killing, raping civilians, and looting. The government engaged in arbitrary arrests and discrimination against Hutu. In January 1994, a power-sharing agreement brought Hutu Cyprien Ntaryamira to power. Ntaryamira was later killed along with Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana in April 1994, the event which began Rwandas genocide. Civilians continued to govern Burundi amidst violence, until 1996, when Major Pierre Buyoya returned to power in a military coup, pledging to restore order to the country but adopting practices that targeted Hutu civilians. Only in 1998 did he finally adopt a transitional constitution and agree to share power with the National Assembly that primarily consisted of members from the opposition. 1994 repercussions of genocide in Rwanda The civil war in Burundi is fueled by extremists who propose ethnic solutions to the political clash between the majority Hutus aspirations for democracy and the minority Tutsis fears of genocide. Tutsi fears are based on a history of massacres and the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda, where Rwandan Hutu killed up to 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi in 100 days. Incidents of violence in either Burundi or Rwanda have sent radicalized and traumatized refugees across the borders of central Africa, aggravating internal conflicts. And Burundis civil war became intertwined with the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Africas first "world war". Burundian Hutu rebels cooperated with and operated alongside Rwandan Hutu rebels, some responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, who had established bases in the DRC and in Tanzania. The Burundian government army cooperated with and fought alongside the Rwandan government and Tutsi rebels in the DRC. AREA                                  27,830 sq km, slightly smaller than Maryland POPULATION                                  6,223,897, Hutu 85%, Tutsi 14%, Twa 1%, Europeans 3,000, South Asians 2,000 LANGUAGES                                  Kirundi (official)                                  French (official)                                  Swahili (along Lake Tanganyika and in the Bujumbura area) RELIGIONS                                  Christian 67% (Roman Catholic 62%, Protestant 5%)                                  indigenous beliefs 23%                                  Muslim 10% Burundi World Report 2005: Index Most of Burundi enjoyed relative peace for the first time in a decade during 2004, but the province of Rural Bujumbura just outside the national capital remains a battleground between the rebel National Liberation Forces (FNL) on one side and the combined Burundian Armed Forces and the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) on the other. The FDD is a former rebel movement that joined the government at the end of 2003. The FNL, drawn largely from the majority Hutu population, remains outside the peace process that has brought together other Hutu-dominated groups, including the FDD, with parties of the Tutsi minority who have dominated political and military life for generations. All forces in the country-wide civil war and those involved in the more recent limited combat outside the capital committed grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, killing and raping civilians and pillaging their property. Printer Friendly Version Also Available in Related Material Burundi Country Page Download PDF World Report Chapter Free Email Newsletter Contribute to Human Rights Watch The Arusha Accords of 2000, the first of several power-sharing arrangements between belligerents, provided for a three year period of transition to be ended with national elections by November 1, 2004. By July 2004, the major parties had failed to agree even on a constitution under which such elections could be held. With strong backing from regional heads of state, Hutu-dominated parties pushed through a constitution in September that was rejected by the leading Tutsi-dominated parties on the grounds that it failed to provide adequate safeguards for their rights and security. But just before the new constitution was to take effect, most of the Tutsi-led parties changed their position and agreed to work within the new constitution, at least until a national referendum could be held, now scheduled for the end of 2004, with elections to take place in early 2005.     In June 2004, a South African-led peace-keeping force, operating under the auspices of the African Union, was replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Reaching its full complement only towards the end of the year, ONUB deployed increasing numbers of troops and observers to Rural Bujumbura but without markedly reducing the number of abuses against civilians.     Civilians Targeted by Combatants   Government soldiers in collaboration with the FDD fought to extirpate the FNL from the hills surrounding Bujumbura, areas that had formed the FNL base for years. In some cases they engaged FNL combatants but often they also attacked civilian populations thought to support the FNL by paying them party dues or by giving them food and shelter. They also attacked civilians in reprisal for FNL ambushes against government soldiers or FDD combatants. They deliberately killed civilians, raped women and girls, burned houses, and stole property. FNL forces assassinated those known or thought to be working with the government and stole or extorted property from civilians. Combat and abuse by combatants frequently caused civilians to flee and tens of thousands spent more than six months of the year living in camps, temporary lodgings, or in the bush. By late 2004, government and FDD forces were regularly looting civilians immediately after they had received humanitarian assistance like food, blankets, or other household items. The practice had become so widespread that humanitarian agencies were obliged to suspend deliveries of aid in order to avoid further attacks on people who were living in abject misery. The FDD, in the past occasionally allied with the FNL, saw the other movement as a potential rival for votes if a functional electoral system is established and apparently were the force most responsible for abuses against civilians thought to support the FNL     On August 13, 2004, FNL rebels, apparently together with combatants from other groups, massacred more than 150 Congolese refugees at Gatumba camp, near the Congolese border. More than one hundred Burundian army soldiers and dozens of Burundian national police in nearby barracks failed to respond to repeated calls for help from the civilians, most of them women and children, who were killed by intense gunfire or were burned to death in their tents. As of early November, Burundian military authorities had taken no public action against the officers responsible for this failure to protect civilians under their charge.     Justice   Despite frequent calls for justice, both national and international actors appear driven more by expediency than real concern for accountability. The late 2003 agreement between the government and the FDD, generally supported by the international community, granted "provisional immunity" to all combatants and leaders of both forces, meaning that justice for their crimes would be at least postponed and probably never delivered. Prosecutors in the military justice system now claim that they cannot prosecute accused soldiers because of this "provisional immunity."     Hundreds of FDD combatants detained in Burundian jails, including some accused of crimes resulting in deaths, were released in mid-2004 under this provision. In July 2004 prisoners at most Burundian jails went on strike for several weeks, demanding that they too be released either under the terms of this agreement or under another broader arrangement that provided for the release of "political prisoners." Authorities restored order in the prisons and promised to set up a committee to examine prisoners demands, thus postponing a decision on the complicated question.     Under the Arusha Accords, the parties asked the United Nations to provide an international commission to investigate serious crimes committed in Burundi since 1962. The Security Council did not act on this request until April 2004 and then sent a team only to assess the feasibility of such a commission. The conclusions of the assessment team had not been published by late November, at which time the council seemed more inclined to dispense with further commissions and move directly to supporting prosecution. During these years of delay, Burundian authorities insisted that they wanted an international mechanism to deliver justice but showed no real commitment to delivering justice for these crimes in the national court system.     In 2004, authorities began slowly to implement reforms to the judicial system adopted in 2003 but they have not yet indicted any suspects under a law passed that year against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.     After a spokesman acknowledged FNL responsibility for the Gatumba massacre, the government issued arrest warrants for two FNL leaders but neither has been caught. Faced with the difficulty of prosecuting a complicated as well as a horrendous crime, some Burundians raised the issue of joining the International Criminal Court, a process that had been begun but then stalled in August 2003. Under both domestic and international pressure, the government completed the ratification procedure for membership in the ICC, raising the hope that some such crimes could eventually be punished.     Land and the Return of Refugees   Nearly eighty thousand largely Hutu refugees returned to Burundi from Tanzania by August 2004, but the flow slowed and even temporarily reversed with uncertainty about instability that might result from the failure to hold elections. Hundreds of Tutsi residents also fled from Burundi to Rwanda in September and October, also fearing violence.     The government faces the problem of finding ways to reconcile the property rights of returnees with the rights of those who currently occupy the land. In similar circumstances ten years ago, the return of an earlier generation of refugees and ensuing contests over the control of land sparked the tensions that led to the beginning of the civil war.     Key International Actors   International actors are committed to avoiding a genocide like that which occurred in Rwanda, the neighbor and demographic twin of Burundi, but have been reluctant to commit the necessary resources to promote real peace: the U.N. agreed to a peace-keeping force only in 2004 and still has not agreed to establish a commission to help deliver justice for past serious violations of international law.     South Africa bore most of the cost of the initial African Union peace-keeping force and has also invested substantial political resources in trying to facilitate agreements in Burundi. Its leadership has sometimes meshed poorly with that of other heads of state in the region, but all came together to provide forceful backing for the most recent advance towards a constitution.     Various international actors, particularly the U.N., tried to move the FNL towards negotiations in June and July, but after the Gatumba massacre, they suspended all such efforts. Towards the end of the year, the U.N. and others discretely signaled a willingness to resume talks with the FNL, leaving unclear how they could do so without sacrificing justice for the Gatumba massacre.     The U.N. Human Rights Commission did not renew the mandate of a special rapporteur for Burundi, but human rights personnel attached to the U.N. peacekeeping force became increasingly effective in monitoring abuses.     In late November 2004, Burundi joined international efforts to protect children and ratified two optional protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (formally adopted May 25, 2000), that on the involvement of children in armed conflict and that on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. Head of State: President Domitien Ndayizeye, April 2003- Burundis population principally divided between Tutsi (14 per cent) and Hutu (85 per cent). Remaining 1 per cent Twa (Batwa). Conflict between two major groups over proper division of power within Burundi has frequently turned violent, principally 1972, 1988 and since 1993. Violence has provoked large-scale refugee movements to Burundis neighbours, such that were, as of September 2004, over 750,000 Burundian refugees, mostly in Tanzania. Burundi gained independence 1962, having been Belgian-controlled UN mandate (as part of Ruanda-Urundi) since 1923 and German colony before that. From 1962 until current violence began 1993, Tutsi minority dominated politics in Burundi, maintaining status gained 19th century under Tutsi kings, and subsequently confirmed by colonial administration. Some semblance of interethnic power-sharing existed under UPRONA (Union pour le Progrs National - Union for National Progress) government after 1962; but balance collapsed 1965 when king refused to appoint Hutu PM after Hutu election victory.   Michel Micombero, Tutsi, replaced monarchy with presidential republic after 1966 coup, and following abortive Hutu uprising April 1972, engaged in campaign against Hutu population leading to some 150,000 Hutu deaths and displacement of similar number. Micombero installed Tutsi controlled one-party state under UPRONA following uprising. Micombero himself overthrown in coup 1976 by another Tutsi officer, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, leading to further decline in Hutu political representation and increased inter-clan intrigue among Tutsi military class. Bagaza removed in further coup by another officer, Pierre Buyoya. Wave of violence stemming from Hutu frustration from August 1988 instigated by Tutsi-controlled army, following call by Parti pour la liberation du peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU - Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) for Hutus to take up arms against Tutsi domination. Buyoya ultimately agreed to multiparty elections, held October 1993. Melchior Ndadaye, leader of Hutu Front pour la dmocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU - Burundi Democratic Front) became Burundis first democratically elected president June 1993, but assassinated by Tutsi paratroopers 21 October 1993, sparking latest cycle of violence but not ousting of Hutu-led government. Citing violence against Tutsis, Buyoya ousted Hutu President Sylvestre Nty bantunganya July 1996.